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Abstract
Starting from the median voter model commonly used in the literature to analyse the
determinants of the functional distribution of public spending, we propose a new
multiproduct dynamic model that also allows one to classify the nature of the interaction
–complementarity or substitutability– between the different categories of government
expenditure. As empirical application, we examine the pattern of public spending in Spain
from 1990 to 1997. The results show that the basic determinants of the different items of
expenditure are per capita income, population, the size of the public sector, and the presence
of budget deficits, and that there are significant interdependencies between some components
of the public expenditure.
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There exists a recent, but fertile literature on the influence on economic growth of the size 
and structure (of both income and expenditure) of the public sector
1. In this sense, there have 
been several proposals of theoretical models to analyse under which conditions certain 
changes in the composition of taxation and public spending affect an economy's equilibrium 
growth rate (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Cashin, 1995; Devarajan et al., 
1996; Mendoza et al., 1997; Gemmell and Kneller, 2002; among others). Likewise, there have 
been some models developed in which both the taxation (Hettich and Winer, 1988) and the 
expenditure structures (Tridimas, 2001) result from a process of maximization on the part of 
the government, in which the objective function represents the expected electoral backing for 
the taxation and spending decisions that the government is thinking of making. 
Two questions arise from the aforementioned studies. What factors determine the 
differences between countries in the functional distributions that are observed? And, for a 
given country, how have the spending structure evolved historically, what are the principal 
determinants of each function, and what is the observed pattern of complementarity-
substitutability between the different budgetary items? 
The first of these questions was addressed by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and Sanz and 
Velázquez (2002), inter al. The former made a detailed analysis of the observed tendencies in 
the composition of the public spending of several countries during the XX century. And the 
latter analysed the main factors determining the differing functional composition of public 
spending observed in a sample of OECD countries in the period 1970-1997. 
The present work addresses the second group of questions, proposing an empirical model 
that can be used in order to make explicit the nature of the interactions between all 
expenditure components. As an application, this model is used with reference to data for 
Spain's public administration sector from 1970 to 1997, analysing the factors that have 
determined the observed functional distribution in Spain's public spending in that period, and 
the nature of the relationship (whether competition or complementarity) between the various 
functions of that expenditure. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the model to use as the basis for 
the estimations: after describing the standard –static– model of demand for public services, 
this is extended to include the temporal evolution of the system describing each expenditure 
function's share in the total. The result is a new –dynamic– demand model that allows a 
simultaneous analysis of the effect of the moderating variables and of the relationship 
between the different types of expenditure. Section 3 presents details of the most significant 
results of the estimates made with this model applied to the Spanish economy. Finally, 
Section 4 gives the main conclusions of the work. 
 
2.  The theoretical and the empirical model 
 
As in most studies of the demand for public services, the theoretical model that will be 
used as the point of departure is based on the median voter-taxpayer approach developed by 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). In this model, the 
amount of public goods and services that taxpayers consume is basically a function of the per 
capita income of those demanding public spending, of the relative price of public expenditure 
with respect to private sector goods, and of the size of the population. Specifically, the 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of the current state of the topic see, inter al., the works of Agell et al. (1997, 1999), 
Bleaney et al. (2001), Fölster and Henrekson (1999), Kneller et al. (1999), Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) and the 
references therein. aggregate government expenditure demand function derived from individual voter-taxpayer 
consumption functions is:  
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where  α η η β γ 2 ) 1 )( 1 ( − + − + = , α  and β  are the income and price elasticities of demand 
for general government provided good and services, respectively, η  is the degree of 
privatization of the public services, G is the total public spending in real terms, Ypc is the real 
per capita income, Pr the relative price of the public sector (defined by C/Px, C being the unit 
cost of G and Px the price of private goods), and N is the population. 
Assuming that the total spending G may be disaggregated into n groups, and that one has 
a function of type 
i i i N P Y a G r pc i i
γ β α = ,
2 for each expenditure function i=1,2,…,n, then the 
proportion of public spending allocated to each expenditure group will be given by the 
expression 
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which is the basic (static) theoretical expression for the disaggregated demand for public 
services in terms of each expenditure function's share. 
The theoretical relationship (2) can be made dynamic by applying the following statistical 
support. Let the share of the i-th spending function in total public spending at time t be  ) (t wi . 
Then this model examines the possible forms of interaction between those shares by 
describing the temporal evolution of the system given by the n-dimensional vector 
() ′ = ) ( , ), ( ), ( ) ( 2 1 t w t w t w t W n K  for t=1,2,..,T (where n indicates the number of spending 
categories considered and T is a finite time period). 
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arbitrary as long as it satisfies the condition of being positive. 
If one takes the n-th expenditure group as being numerary
3, one could then work with the 
functions  () ( )( ) 1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 − = • • = • n k F F H n k k K      , and the dynamic system will be given by 
the expression 
                                                 
2 In principle, one would expect a different relative price (Pr,i) for each expenditure group, and a function for Gi 
that would not only depend on this relative price but also on the prices of the other groups. In our case, given the 
lack of disaggregated price data for the various public services, we did not test this possibility. 
3 All the statistical procedures are invariant with respect to the choice of numerary function (for details of this 
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Dendrinos and Sonis (1990), the following function is proposed in this work (the introduction 
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) ( ) (  is the total public spending.  
This expression together with the theoretical specification (2) leads to the following 
system of log-linear equations:
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One observes that the parameters of the variables Ypc, Pr and N are elasticities relative to 
that of the numerary spending function, and therefore measure the effect of a unitary change 
in the relevant variable, balanced out by an also unitary change in the numerary category. 
Furthermore, a null value of any of these parameters should not be interpreted as indicating 
that the corresponding variable does not affect the spending allocated to a given group, but 
that the way it does so is the same as that of the numerary spending group. 
The parameters 
n
ik a  and 
n
iG a  represent the pseudo-elasticities of inter-functional and total 
growth, respectively. The former are basic in the analysis of substitutability/complementarity 
between the different spending functions, in terms of both sign and magnitude: a positive 
value for a parameter 
n
ik a  will denote complementary growth between the two expenditure 
groups and a negative value a competitive relationship (if the relative share of the function k 
rises one year, the other relative share will fall the following year).
5 Likewise, if the parameter 
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note that the conditions established by Devarajan et al. (1996, p. 319) for a change in the 
share of group i -compensated by the group n- to produce a rise in the economy's equilibrium rate may be written 
as  n i n i w w β β θ / log / log < . One sees that the variable on the left-hand side of this equation is the same as the 
dependent variable of model (6), so that the latter could be interpreted as a form of analysing the temporal 
evolution of the basic variable defining the equilibrium condition corresponding to each observed spending 
structure. 
5 The interpretation of the parameters 
n
ii a  is, of course, different. In this case, they are associated to the degree of 
persistence of the volume of resources dedicated to the i-th expenditure item: in particular, they measure to what 
degree the (relative) share of one year determines the proportion dedicated to this expenditure function the 
following year. n
iG a  is positive, the relative share of the i-th expenditure group grows when total public 
spending grows, while a negative value means that this group loses share when the total 
spending rises. 
Finally, it should be remarked that the system (6) can be understood as "basic", in the 
sense of deriving from both the elementary theoretical specification (2) and the dynamic 
system (4)-(5). Nevertheless, it could be extended by adding other control variables proposed 
in the literature to explain the variations in median-voter’s preferences or the growth of 
specific public spending groups, and other political and institutional variables that can help to 
improve the specification of the system. Candidates for such additional variables are the 
country's demographic structure, the population density, the ratio of revenues to public 
spending, the level of visibility of taxes, the degree of decentralization in public spending, or 
additional lags in the explanatory variables. 
We here extend the original model (6) in two directions. Firstly, we start with the 
hypothesis that taxpayers may have a mistaken perception of the price of public services 
(Gemmell  et al., 1999). We shall thus assume that the phenomenon of fiscal illusion is 
basically caused by inadequate visibility in the payment of taxation, as well as by the 
existence of deficits in public accounts. This means the addition of two new variables to the 
system: the logarithm of the deficit ratio ( D log ) and the logarithm of the degree of visibility 
of taxes ( V log ). 
One also finds reports in the literature that the demographic structure can bias the 
structure of public spending towards specific items
6. For this reason, while bearing in mind 
that the groups of spending considered here are too broad to allow clear results to be derived 
concerning this issue, we also incorporated the variables  15 logPN  and  65 logPN  into the 
model. These measure the logarithm of the fractions of the population below 15 years old and 
above 65 years old, respectively. 
 
3.  Empirical application: The allocation of public spending in Spain 
 
In this section, the model described in the previous section will be used to analyse the 
disaggregated demand for public services in Spain during the period 1970-1997.
7 
With respect to the categories of public expenditure (Gi) that we shall consider, since the 
data are for a single country only and a time period of less than thirty years, we aggregated 
the initially available groups into just four. Specifically, we distinguished between 
expenditure on public goods (defence and general Administration services), social benefits 
(pensions, unemployment, and other benefits), preferential goods (education, health, housing 
and collective services), and State intervention in the economy including both economic 
services (investment, subsidies to exploitation and capital transfers) and interest payments on 
                                                 
6 For example, the older the population, the higher the proportion of public expenditure dedicated to transfer 
payments (typically dominated by pensions and social security benefits). Also a rise in the ratio of young people 
could generate parents’ pressure to increase public educational expenditure. 
7 The statistical data were obtained from the National Statitical Institute (INE), the Bank of Spain, the Ministry 
of Finance and other indirect sources (Alcaide, 1988; Argimón et al., 1999; Valle, 1996). Even though a longer 
series for some variables is available, it has only been possible to work with homogeneous data for the 
disaggregated public expenditure for the period 1970-1997. Previous to 1970 there is no reliable data, and after 
1997, the statistical classification used (SEC95) is not compatible with the one used for 1970-1997 (SEC79). 
Then, because our data period ends almost a decade ago, our paper could be framed more as an application of the 
proposed model rather than as a statement of the current state of the public spending in Spain. [For more details 
on methodological issues and statistical sources, see, among others, Argimón et al. (1999) and Utrilla and Pérez 
(2001). For a detailed analysis of the evolution of public expenditure in Spain, see Salinas and Álvarez (2003).] public debt. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the different categories of spending (in real 
terms) together with their growth rates during the period studied. 
The other variables used in the estimation are the following: total public spending in real 
terms (G) is the sum of the expenditures in the four categories considered; real per capita 
income (Ypc) as measured by the per capita GDP at 1995 market prices in pesetas; the relative 
price (Pr) as approximated by the ratio between the public sector deflator (calculated as the 
weighted mean of the deflators of the different components of consumption of the public 
administrations –government final consumption, government gross domestic fixed capital 
formation and transfers) and the implicit GDP price index (base 1995=100); the public 
administration deficit, D, calculated as the ratio between revenues and expenditures; Spain's 
total resident population, N; the proportions, PN15 and PN65, below 15 years old and above 
65 years old, respectively; and a measure of the degree of visibility of taxation, V, as the ratio 
between indirect taxes (specifically, the taxes linked to production and imports) and total 
government revenues. Table 1 contains the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
this empirical section. 
After this description of the variables, we shall next describe how we approached the 
problem of estimating the demand system formulated in the previous section. 
Firstly, with respect to the econometric specification used, we added to the formulated 
system of equations a multivariate normal (n-1)-vector ) , , ( 1 1 − = n u u u K , with null means and 
non-diagonal (constant) covariance matrix given by Ω, to take into account the possible 
correlation between the errors of the different equations. Given this specification, the method 
of estimation chosen was the SUR (Zellner, 1962) as being appropriate for these "seemingly" 
unrelated regressions. 
Secondly, we estimated the demand system with all the control variables ("basic" and 
"complementary") included. Of the extra variables initially added to the model (6), only the 
variable  D log  was found to be globally significant
8. We therefore decided to eliminate the 
rest, and only include the basic variables plus the aforementioned deficit variable. Neither in 
this model was the price variable found to be significant at the standard significance levels 
(W=5.843, P=0.11), but since it did lie within the 90% interval, we finally decided not to 
eliminate it. The final results following this initial specification search are given in Table 2.
9 
In general terms, the statistical fit was good for the three equations estimated ( 9 . 0
2 ≈ R ), 
with several significant variables in each, and was especially so for the preferential goods and 
social benefits demand equations. Nevertheless, we shall perform a conjoint significance 
analysis of each of the model's variables because of the problems of multicollinearity to which 
the estimated system may be subject. As mentioned in Section 3, the elasticities of the Ypc, Pr 
and N regressors (and the variable D) should be interpreted in relation with that corresponding 
to the numerary group –in our case government expenditure on intervention in the economy. 
With regard to the first variable in order of statistical significance, per capita income was 
found to be a basic determinant in the distribution of public spending (W=25.338, P=0.00), 
                                                 
8 The Wald statistic and the P-value corresponding to the nullity constraints of the parameters of the variables 
V log ,  15 log PN  and  65 log PN  were W=5.016 (P=0.17),  W=0.837 (P=0.84), and W=2.102 (P=0.55), 
respectively.  Since we are searching for additional explanatory power of other regressors, we have decided to 
drop those variables not found to be significant in the empirical analysis in order to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity between all the variables of the system. Anyway, when the variables  V log ,  15 log PN  and 
65 log PN  are included in the model, the results do not differ significantly from those reported in Table 2. The 
authors will provide these results upon request. 
9 The estimated system passed all the standard specification tests. Thus, as well as the (multivariate) test of 
functional specification, serial correlation, normality, and heteroskedasticity not being significant, the model's 
associated eigenvalues were less than unity, so that the system satisfies the stability condition. with notably high values of the (relative) income elasticities of the preferential goods and 
social benefits groups. This result indicates that government expenditures in these groups 
appear to increase –relatively– more than proportionately with per capita national income.
10 
Secondly, total public spending (G) was also highly significant (W=18.429, P=0.00), with 
the estimated pseudo-elasticities being negative in the three cases. This result suggests a 
preference to increase the share of intervention expenditure (to the detriment of the rest) when 
the available volume of resources increases, and it also shows that in Spain the size of the 
public sector has a decisive effect on both economic services and public debt interest 
expenditures.
11  
The third variable in order of significance (W=10.980, P=0.01) was the deficit (D), which 
indicates that the share of taxation-financed spending significantly conditions not only the 
volume of resources available but also how they are allocated.
12 Thus, our empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis of deficit illusion and it also shows that Spanish fiscal policy 
influences the preferences of the median voters, changing their expenditure allocation model 
on the various public goods and services.
13 
In addition to the above variables, the population also has a major impact on the 
distribution of public spending (W=7.197, P=0.06), again with a notably different effect on 
the allocations to preferential goods and social benefits. However, as previously mentioned, 
the age structure of the population does not seem to affect the pattern of demand for public 
services
14, although this result is probably reflecting the aggregated nature of those 
expenditure groups considered in this work. 
Last, the relative price of public-sector goods and services seems to have no significant 
differential effect on any of the budgetary groups, although this result could be an artefact of 
the high degree of aggregation of the expenditure groups considered and/or to the fact that we 
are using the same price for all expenditure groups (see note 2). Nevertheless, as was 
observed in the results for the estimated aggregate expenditure function, the effect of the 
                                                 
10 A wide range of studies in the literature have found absolute elasticities greater than one for public spending 
on health, education or housing, revealing their luxury good nature (see, for example, Falch and Rattso, 1997; 
Gerdham et al., 1992; Newhouse, 1987; Snyder and Yackovlev, 2000). Additionally, the level of per capita 
income allows broader social security coverage, at the same time that influences aspects related to inequality 
(Atkinson, 1995; Clements et al., 1998; Tait and Heller, 1982). 
11 Similar results were obtained in Mongelli (1997) and Randolph et al. (1996) 
12 In order to find evidence for how the deficit influences the volume of public spending, we estimated the 
aggregate expenditure demand function presented at the beginning of Section 2 (extended with fiscal illusion 
measures). The results were as follows (the equation was estimated by OLS, but a similar result was obtained, 
except for the case of the price variable, on using the fully-modified OLS estimator proposed by Phillips and 
Hansen, 1990): 
V D N P Y G r pc log
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[The values in parentheses are the t statistics for each estimated parameter]. 
          One sees that all the variables are significant at the standard 5% significance level. In particular, the 
coefficient estimated for the deficit variable (-0.52) indicates that public expenditure is greater the smaller is the 
ratio D, i.e., the smaller the proportion of expenditure financed by taxes. Also it is worthwhile to mention that 
the measure of invisibility of taxes is significantly different from zero, showing that voter-taxpayers demand 
more public expenditure when the tax structure switches towards indirect taxes. 
13 Fiscal illusion in the form of excess demand for public goods and services has been also found in Ashworth 
(1995) and Gemmell et al. (1999). On the other hand, some recent evidence about the effects of fiscal policy on 
the structure of government expenditures can be found, for example, in Cashin et al. (2001), Baqir (2002) or 
Jonakin and Stephens (1999). 
14 The results in the literature broadly show that old-age and school-age sectors of population have a positive 
impact on education, health, housing and social security expenditures since they are who make most use of these 
services (Fernández and Rogerson, 1997; Hagemann and Nicoletti, 1989; Heller et al., 1986; Hitiris, 1999; 
Poterba, 1997). relative cost of public services is significant and negative in sign, suggesting price-elastic 
demand for aggregate government-provided goods and services. 
Overall, the findings confirm the results in the literature on the importance of income, the 
size of the public sector, and the population in explaining the behaviour of public 
administration spending, and also show the significant influence of public deficit on the 
administration's budgeting process. 
With respect to the observed pattern of interaction between the different expenditure 
functions, firstly there was the weak interrelationship in the case of public goods, where only 
the elasticity of the preferential goods group (
4
2 , 1 a ) was found to be marginally significant, 
with a value of 0.52. This positive value shows that an increase of the significance of the 
expenditures in preferential goods in the Spanish economy also increases the relative 
proportion of expenditures on public goods. 
On the contrary, there were significant interactions between preferential goods 
expenditure and the public goods and social benefits groups. In the former case, the estimate 
of -1.06 for the elasticity 
4
1 , 2 a  indicates a high level of substitutability between the two 
functions while, in the latter (
4
3 , 2 a ), the elasticity of 0.65 indicates a complementarity 
relationship between the expenditures in preferential goods and in social benefits. 
Likewise, in the case of the social benefits demand equation, the value of the elasticity 
4
1 , 3 a  (-0.81) is highly significant, indicative in this case also of a competitive growth 
relationship between the expenditures of this group and those of the public goods group. 
Finally, with respect to the parameters of persistence of the spending 
4
,i i a , there is a highly 
significant value only in the case of social benefits group. The estimated value (0.78) 
indicates that the spending allocated each year to this group is highly dependent on the levels 
of spending of previous years (as measured by the term ( ) 1 4 3 / − w w ). 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This work is intended to be a one-step ahead to the still sparse literature approaching the 
analysis of the structure of public spending. The main contribution has been to generalize the 
median voter model by including dynamic aspects. The new model is capable not only of 
measuring the impact of the classical determinants (income, relative public service prices, 
population, total expenditure, etc.), but also of yielding additional relevant information on the 
trade-offs that exist between the different spending categories. 
The model's utility was demonstrated by applying it to the Spanish public sector. Thus, 
firstly, the results reinforce some already known conclusions on the basic determinants of the 
different items of expenditure. Secondly, the dynamic model adds new evidence to the 
existing knowledge about the topic of budget expenditure composition. In summary, not only 
were some of the standard control variables found to be significant, but significant 
interactions were also detected between some of the public services, and these interactions 
were classified as relationships of complementarity or substitutability. References 
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1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
State intervention Perc. change (%)
 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev.  Maximum  Minimum 
w1  0.16 0.02 0.19 0.13 
w2  0.36 0.02 0.42 0.33 
w3 0.25  0.01 
 
0.28 0.23 
w4  0.23 0.03 0.28 0.17 
G  20461.70 8839.68 33087.57 7457.06 
Ypc  1461.289 254.06  1946.07 1046.05 
Pr  0.973935  0.04 1.03 0.86 
D  0.95 0.06 1.05 0.85 
N  38145.89 1769.52 39853.00  33885.00 
PN15  24.36 4.09 29.00  16.90 
PN65  12.05 1.85 15.70 9.60 
V  0.27 0.03 0.35 0.23 
 
Table 2: SUR estimates of the (extended) complete demand system (4) 
Dependent variable / 
Explanatory variables 
Public goods eq. 
() 4 1 / log w w  
Preferential goods eq. 
( ) 4 2 / log w w  
Social spending eq. 
() 4 3 / log w w  











































































2 R   0.92 0.89 0.89 
SSR  0.10 0.13 0.10 
  Residual covariance matrix 
  () 4 1 / log w w   ( ) 4 1 / log w w   () 4 3 / log w w  
() 4 1 / log w w   0.0039 0.0029 0.0032 
() 4 1 / log w w   0.0029 0.0047 0.0033 
() 4 3 / log w w   0.0032 0.0033 0.0036 
NOTES: Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses; significance levels are represented as * (10%), ** 
(5%) and *** (1%); SSR is the sum of the squares of the residuals. 
 